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NORTH SEA ECONOMICS 
 
Research in North Sea Economics has been conducted in the Economics Department 
since 1973.  The present and likely future effects of oil and gas developments on the 
Scottish economy formed the subject of a long term study undertaken for the Scottish 
Office.  The final report of this study, The Economic Impact of North Sea Oil on 
Scotland, was published by HMSO in 1978.  In more recent years further work has been 
done on the impact of oil on local economies and on the barriers to entry and 
characteristics of the supply companies in the offshore oil industry. 
 
The second and longer lasting theme of research has been an analysis of licensing and 
fiscal regimes applied to petroleum exploitation.  Work in this field was initially 
financed by a major firm of accountants, by British Petroleum, and subsequently by the 
Shell Grants Committee.  Much of this work has involved analysis of fiscal systems in 
other oil producing countries including Australia, Canada, the United States, Indonesia, 
Egypt, Nigeria and Malaysia.  Because of the continuing interest in the UK fiscal 
system many papers have been produced on the effects of this regime. 
 
From 1985 to 1987 the Economic and Social Science Research Council financed 
research on the relationship between oil companies and Governments in the UK, 
Norway, Denmark and The Netherlands.  A main part of this work involved the 
construction of Monte Carlo simulation models which have been employed to measure 
the extents to which fiscal systems share in exploration and development risks. 
 
Over the last few years the research has examined the many evolving economic issues 
generally relating to petroleum investment and related fiscal and regulatory matters.  
Subjects researched include the economics of incremental investments in mature oil 
fields, economic aspects of the CRINE initiative, economics of gas developments and 
contracts in the new market situation, economic and tax aspects of tariffing, economics 
of infrastructure cost sharing, the effects of comparative petroleum fiscal systems on 
incentives to develop fields and undertake new exploration, the oil price responsiveness 
of the UK petroleum tax system, and the economics of decommissioning, mothballing 
and re-use of facilities.  This work has been financed by a group of oil companies and 
Scottish Enterprise, Energy.  The work on CO2 Capture, EOR and storage was financed 
by a grant from the Natural Environmental Research Council (NERC) in the period 
2005 – 2008.  
For 2018 the programme examines the following subjects: 
 
a. Economics of Decommissioning Monitoring Obligation and Residual Liability 
in Perpetuity 
b. Enhancing Understanding of the Decommissioning Cost Structure, its Timing, 
and the Related Opportunities for the Supply Chain 
c. Economics of EOR with Sepcial Reference to Polymer Flood Schemes 
d. Prospective Activity Levels in the UKCS to 2050 
e. Exploration of Case for IA for RFCT 
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f. Follow-up to Results of Consultaiton on TTH 
g. Economics of Cluster Developments 
h. Government Subsidies and the Oil and Gas Sector 
 
The authors are solely responsible for the work undertaken and views expressed.  The 
sponsors are not committed to any of the opinions emanating from the studies. 
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Investment Hurdles in the UKCS and their Effects: A Response to the OGA 
Consultation on the Approach to “Satisfactory Expected Commercial 
Return” in the MER UK Strategy 
 
Professor Alex Kemp and Linda Stephen 
Aberdeen Centre for Research in Energy Economics and Finance (ACREEF) 
 
1. Introduction and Context 
The publication of a Consultation document by the OGA on the approach to a 
“satisfactory expected commercial return” in the MER UK Strategy may be 
regarded as a landmark in the development of UK Government policy towards 
the UKCS.  It seeks to highlight an issue which traditionally has not been openly 
discussed.  Investors generally regard investment hurdles and their application at 
a detailed level as commercially sensitive matters.   
 
Individual investors are also likely to view investmet projects differently.  This 
explains why there are sales and purchases of assets in the UKCS (and elsewhere).  
The future expected value obtainable from a given asset as seen by one company 
may very well differ from that as seen by another.  Views can differ regarding 
several factors determining expected value from a field such as geological 
interpretation, reservoir behaviour, future capital and operating costs, scope for 
EOR projects, future oil and gas prices, and decommissioning costs.  With respect 
to exploration projects geological interpretations may also vary.  With regard to 
infrastructure provision for third parties views can vary regarding the prospective 
volumes of oil and gas and the potential tariffs obtainable. 
 
Investors may thus view a given opportunity differently even when they have the 
same investment hurdle.  When they have different investment hurdles this 
consititutes a further reason for the presence of differences in the definition of a 
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satisfactory expected commercial return (SECR).  There is a will of the wisp 
aspect to the question.  Given all the above this paper sets out to elucidate the 
application of the concept to the conditions currently prevailing in the UKCS. 
 
2. Investment Hurdles and the Current Characteristics of the UKCS 
While explicit investment hurdles employed in the oil and gas industry are 
generally not openly published there is plenty casual empiricism on the subject 
as well as independent assessments on at least some aspects of the subject.  Thus 
net present values (NPVs) at different discount rates, internal rates of return 
(IRRs), and ratios of net present value to investment (NPV/I) are commonly 
calculated.  Payback periods and maximum cash exposure are also commonly 
calculated as relevant yardsticks. 
  
These well-known criteria need to be seen in the context of the present position 
of the industry and the UKCS in particular.  In terms of the overall investment 
environment the UKCS is a mature province reflected generally in (a) substantial 
numbers of mature fields, (b) large numbers of small, undeveloped discoveries, 
(c) relatively large development and operating costs per boe, reflecting the 
relatively low production per field in many cases and the age of the producing 
systems.  With respect to exploration the prospectivity in most parts of the UKCS 
is for relatively small discoveries.  The average is around 20 mmboe but the most 
likely sizes are less that this reflecting the lognormal distribution of field sizes.  
Larger discoveries are possible in the W of S region but the costs are also higher 
there.  A consequence of the above is that the materiality of prospective returns 
(expressed as the size of net cash flows at the investor’s discount rate) is relatively 
modest for the majority of projects, but much larger for some others.  For the 
UKCS as a whole the NPV profiles of fields in relation to the discount rate very 
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often intersect, giving conflicting rankings.  An example of this phenomenon is 
shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 
NPV Profiles of Large and Small Fields in UKCS 
 
 
In Figure 1 Project A is a large, long-lived field.  The NPV profile falls at a 
relatively brisk pace as the discount rate increases reflecting its effect on a long-
lived project.  Project B is a small, short-lived field.  The NPV profile falls much 
more slowly as the discount rate increases because there are no very distant cash 
flows. 
 
The above issue is very common in the UKCS.  A result is that the NPV and IRR 
hurdles give conflicting rankings.  In Figure 1 Project A has a much larger NPV 
than Project B at the discount rate c which represents the cost of capital.  But 
Project B has a higher IRR than Project A.  Thus, if ranking of projects is required, 
the 2 criteria produce different answers. 
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But ranking is likely to be required because of the presence of capital rationing.  
A small project such as an infill well will typically have a relatively short life but 
could have a high IRR due to modest capital and operating costs. 
 
Contrary to the impression gained in some textbooks on corporate finance, capital 
rationing is very prevalent in the oil and gas industry as elsewhere.  It may be 
self-imposed or imposed by external factors such as restrictions by banks or other 
creditors.  When the oil price collapsed in the period from late 2014 to 2016 the 
capital rationing problem clearly became more pronounced.  Banks have always 
adopted a very conservative oil price for screening project loans, typically very 
considerably below that pertaining at the time of the loan application.  For 
example, if the current market price were $65 a loan screening price could be as 
low as $45. 
 
At any one time large oil companies will have investment opportunities exceeding 
their capital budget, sometimes by a considerable margin.  Again a rationing 
mechanism has to be devised.  From Figure 1 it is clear that to maximise NPV at 
the discount rate reflecting the cost of capital Project A should be ranked ahead 
of Project B.  But typically in a capital rationing situation the post-tax NPV/pre-
tax investment ratio is calculated and used for ranking projects.  This is because 
it highlighs the return in terms of NPV per $ invested and thus measures the 
productivity of the scarce capital. 
 
In the Consultation document much attention is given to the appropriate discount 
rate and in particular to the weighted average cost of capital on which it can be 
based.  The Consultation document defines this as the rate which reflects 
systematic or market-correlated risks which cannot be mitigated or diversified 
away.  Referring to a study carried out for the OGA by OXERA the document 
quotes for E and P companies a nominal, post-tax WACC in the range 6.9%-8.3% 
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for E and P companies, and for integrated companies a range of 5%-6.5%.  For 
pipeline companies a range of 4.9%-7.2% is quoted. 
 
Several questions arise here.  The document argues that discount rates are best 
shown in nominal terms because taxes are paid in nominal terms.  This is the case 
but it does not mean that prospective returns are not estimated in real terms by 
investors.  The present authors routinely initially calculate project cash flows in 
MOD terms but subsequently calculate the post-tax returns in real terms.  
Investors can readily do this and may be well aware of the need to distinguish 
between returns before and after inflation. 
 
Using the MOD numbers for the WACC in the Consultation document the precise 
values in real terms with inflation at 2.5% (below the current level) are shown in 
Table 1. 
Table 1 
WACC IN MOD TERMS (%) WACC IN REAL TERMS (%) 
6.9 4.29 
8.3 5.658 
5.0 2.439 
6.5 3.9 
4.9 2.34 
7.2 4.585 
 
These figures seem quite low.  Other published studies on the WACC of oil 
companies give more detailed results.  Every year the Texas Comptroller 
publishes the results of a study on the WACC of oil companies operating in Texas 
and with their shares quoted on the New York Stock Exchange.  The latest issue 
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entitled 2017 Property Value Study: Discount Rate Range for Oil and Gas 
Properties1, provides the results of the WACC of 18 well-known oil companies.  
The data employed were for end 2016.  The average pre-income tax WACC was 
found to be 14.64% with a standard deviation of 1.66.  The average after income 
tax cost of equity was found to be 11.29% and the average cost of debt 4.5%.  As 
an illustrative individual example the before income tax WACC of Chevron was 
found to be 13.32%, the before income tax cost of equity 14.96%, the post-income 
tax cost of equity 9.72%, and the cost of debt 3.01%.  For Apache the before 
income tax WACC was 14.19%, the pre-income tax cost of equity 17.73%, the 
post-tax cost of equity 11.52%, and the cost of debt 4.22%. 
 
An important feature of the results is the relatively low cost of debt.  This has, of 
course, been a noticeable feature in recent years not only in the USA but the UK 
and elsewhere.  While this reflects recent realities it would be unwarranted to 
assume that this will maintain over the long term. 
 
Very broadly speaking the Texas study lends support to the view that integrated 
companies have a lower cost of capital than non-integrated ones, reflecting the 
greater degree of diversification among the former. 
 
The Consultation document suggests a separate range of WACC for 
transportation companies.  There are a few such companies operating in the 
UKCS but it is not clear how their WACC can be calculated.  Whether the 
experience of transportation companies operating onshore in the electricity and 
gas markets is comparable to activities in the UKCS is open to debate.  In the 
UKCS the price and volume risks may be relatively low in the short term, but in 
                                                 
1 See Texas Comptoller of Public Accounts, Publication #96-1166, September 2017, see website: 
https://search.comptroller.texas.gov/viewer/index.jsp?start=0&proxy=%2F&sessionid=29154590-1cfa-4068-
8145-68e46e6f9ca4  
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the longer term they may be greater.  When volumes decline from existing fields 
they need to be replaced to maintain revenues.  This is more uncertain than the 
position with onshore electricity and gas distribution activities. 
 
The Consultation document does not mention the exploration activity as a 
separate one.  There are such companies.  Their risks are clearly greater.  They 
will find it very difficult to raise debt finance.  Banks generally do not lend for 
this activity.  The equity costs of exploration companies will inevitably be higher 
than those of ingtegrated companies, (whether horizontal or vertical).  In the 
present position in the UKCS it is argueable that the WACC of exploration 
companies should be separately considered. 
 
While estimates of the WACC certainly add value to a discussion of discount 
rates the values resulting from calculations by using the CAPM, for example, 
cannot be conclusive.  While direct empirical knowledge of discount rates 
actually employed is elusive it is known to the present authors that a 10% post-
tax rate is very widely employed.  Some use MOD and other real terms.  
Generally this would be used initially to screen all new investments.  In this 
context it is noteworthy that in The Maximising Economic Recovery Strategy for 
the UK it is stated that, for the purposes of the Central Obligation, economicaly 
recoverable resources are to be calculated using a 10% pre-tax real discount rate.  
It is also noteworthy that, for purposes of calculating the Ring Fence Expenditure 
Supplement a 10% compound interest rate in MOD terms is used. 
 
As discussed above the reality of capital rationing needs to be considered.  A 
discount rate of 10% rather than the lower rates based on WACC may be used to 
reflect capital rationing.  Potential projects are also likely to be ranked according 
to post-tax NPV/pre-tax I ratios using the discount rate discussed immediately 
above.  Acceptability would depend on the resulting value and on the total budget 
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available.  The Consultation document indicates minimum NPV/I ratios for 
acceptability of 0.2 or 0.3.  The authors’ own knowledge is that a ratio of 0.3 
could generally be acceptable (When the oil price was substantially below current 
levels OGUK considered that 0.5 might better reflect the effects of capital 
rationing).  It is noteworthy that using the NPV/I ratio for ranking and screening 
purposes often gives different results compared to ranking by IRR.  The NPV/I 
method gives more weight to the materiality of the project. 
 
3. Methodology for Empirical Modelling 
 
Financial modelling has been conducted to calculate the returns on a large number 
of currently undeveloped discoveries in the UKCS plus future discoveries which 
could be made in future years.  The simulation modelling, including the use of 
Monte Carlo technique was informed by a large database of undeveloped fields, 
many validated by the relevant operators and covered the period to 2050.  Other 
field data are a combination of public and private domain information and 
estimates made by the authors.  The overall field database incorporates key, best 
estimate information on production, and investment, operating and 
decommissioning expenditures.  They relate to 14 probable fields, and 14 
unsanctioned fields which are currently being examined for development.  In 
addition, there are 249 fields defined as being in the category of technical 
reserves.  Only summary data on the reserves (oil/gas/condensate) and block 
locations are available for these, and estimates of production and cost profiles 
were made by the authors.  These fields are not currently being examined for 
development by licensees. 
Monte Carlo modelling was employed to estimate the possible numbers of new 
discoveries in the period to 2047. The modelling incorporated assumptions based 
on recent trends relating to exploration effort, success rates, sizes, and types of 
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discovery (oil, gas, condensate). A moving average of the behavior of these 
variables over the past 5 years was calculated separately for 5 areas of the UKCS 
(Southern North Sea (SNS), Central North Sea/Moray Firth (CNS/MF), Northern 
North Sea (NNS), West of Shetlands (WoS), and Irish Sea (IS)). The results were 
employed for use in the Monte Carlo analysis.  Because of the very limited data 
for the WoS and IS judgmental assumptions on success rates and average sizes 
of discoveries were made for the modelling.  
 
It is postulated that the exploration effort depends substantially on a combination 
of (a) the expected success rate, (b) the likely size of discovery, and (c) oil/gas 
prices. In the present study 2 future oil/gas price scenarios were employed as 
follows: 
Table 1 
Future Oil and Gas Price Scenarios 
 Oil Price (real) 
$/bbl 
Gas Price (real) 
pence/therm 
Medium 60 50 
Low 50 40 
 
These price scenarios are designed to reflect investment screening prices, 
not market values.  In this context, it should be noted that, when oil prices 
were $100 or more banks typically employed oil prices in the $65-$75 
range to assess loan applications.  With market prices of c. $50 banks may 
use prices in the $35 - $46 range to assess loan applications.  In MOD terms 
the price scenario starting with $60 in 2017 becomes $115 in 2050, and the 
scenario starting with $50 in 2017 becomes over $96 in 2050.  The 
structure of costs between dollars and sterling in the modelling reflects the 
up-to-date position. 
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The postulated numbers of annual exploration wells drilled for the whole 
of the UKCS are as follows for 2017, 2030, 2040, and 2045: 
 
Table 2 
Exploration Wells Drilled 
 2017 2030 2040 2045 
Medium effort 15 12 10 9 
Low effort 12 9 7 6 
 
It is postulated that success rates depend substantially on a combination of 
(a) recent experience, and (b) size of the effort.  It is further suggested that 
higher effort is associated with more discoveries, but with lower success 
rates compared to reduced levels of effort.  This reflects the view that low 
levels of effort will be concentrated on the lowest risk prospects, and thus 
higher effort involves the acceptance of higher risk.  For the UKCS as a 
whole 2 success rates were postulated as follows with the medium one 
reflecting the average over the past 5 years. 
 
 
Table 3 
Success Rates for UKCS 
Low effort/Medium success rate                       33% 
Medium effort/Lower success rate                    30% 
 
It should be noted that success rates have varied considerably across the 5 
sectors of the UKCS.  The annual number of discoveries has been low since 
2010 reflecting the large decline in the number of exploration wells since 
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2008.  It is assumed that technological progress will maintain historic 
success rates over the time period. 
 
The mean sizes of discoveries made in the historic periods for each of the 
5 regions were calculated.  It was then assumed that the mean size of 
discovery would decrease in line with recent historic experience.  They are 
shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 
Mean Discovery Size MMboe 
Year 2017 2045 
SNS 20 15 
CNS/MF 17 12 
NNS 38 6 
WoS 59 28 
IS 9 4 
 
For purposes of the Monte Carlo modelling of the size of new discoveries 
the standard deviation (SD) was set at 50% of the mean value.  In line with 
historic experience the size distribution of discoveries was taken to be 
lognormal. 
 
Using the above information, the Monte Carlo technique was employed to 
project discoveries in the 5 regions to 2047.  For the period to 2050 the 
total numbers of discoveries for the whole of the UKCS were as follows:  
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Table 5 
Total Number of Discoveries to 2050 
Medium effort/Lower success rate                   117 
Lower Effort/Medium Success Rate                  97 
 
For each region the average development costs (per boe) of fields in the 
probable and possible categories were calculated.  These reflect the cost 
reductions over the last few years.  Investment costs per boe depend on 
several factors including not only the absolute costs in different operating 
conditions (such as water depth), but on the size of the fields.  For all of 
the UKCS the average development cost was calculated to be $16.66 per 
boe with the highest being $21.72.  In the SNS development costs were 
found to average $11.44 per boe.  In the CNS/MF, they averaged $18.5 per 
boe, in the WoS average development costs were $15.78 per boe (reflecting 
the relative large size of fields), and in the NNS they averaged $21.6 per 
boe.   
 
Operating costs over the lifetime of the fields were also calculated.  The 
average has fallen from $19 per boe to $11.5 for all of the UKCS.  They 
are now estimated at $6 per boe in the SNS, $13 per boe in the CNS/MF, 
$12.5 per boe in the WoS, and $14.6 per boe in the NNS.  Total lifetime 
field costs (including decommissioning but excluding E and A costs) were 
found to have fallen from an average of $38.9 per boe for all of the UKCS 
to $34.8 per boe, with $23 per boe in the SNS, $38 per boe in the CNS/MF, 
$30 per boe in the WoS (reflecting the relatively large size of fields), and 
$41 per boe in the NNS. 
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Using these as the mean values the Monte Carlo technique was employed 
to calculate the development costs of new discoveries.  A normal 
distribution with a SD = 20% of the mean value was employed.  Annual 
operating costs were modelled as a percentage of accumulated 
development costs.  This percentage varies according to field size.  It was 
taken to increase as the size of the field was reduced reflecting the presence 
of economies of scale.  The field lifetime costs in very small fields could 
become very high on a boe basis. 
 
With respect to fields in the category of technical reserves it was 
recognised that there are many major challenges, and so the mean 
development costs in each of the basins was set at $5/boe higher than the 
mean for new discoveries in that basin.  Thus for the CNS/MF the mean 
development costs are $23.5 per boe, and in NNS over $26 per boe.  The 
distribution of these costs was assumed to be normal with a SD = 20% of 
the mean value.  A binomial distribution was employed to find the order of 
new development of fields in this category. 
 
The modelling has been undertaken under the current tax system.  It is 
assumed that probable and possible fields, technical reserves, and new 
discoveries have to generate taxable income from the new projects before 
they can use their tax allowances.  Thus the Ring Fence Expenditure 
Supplement (RFES) is employed.  The modelling is initially undertaken in 
MOD terms with an inflation rate of 2%.  This incorporates the effects of 
any fiscal drag.  The results are then converted to real terms. 
 
In the light of experience over the past few years some rephasing of the 
timing of the commencement dates of new field developments from those 
initially projected by operators was undertaken relating to the probability 
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that the project would go ahead.  Where the operator indicated that a new 
field development had a probability ≥ 80% of going ahead the date was left 
unchanged.  Where the probability ≥ 70% <80% the commencement date 
was slipped by 1 year and where the probability ≥ 50% < 70% the 
commencement date was slipped by 2 years.  Where the probability ≥ 40% 
< 50% the date was slipped by 3 years.  Where the probability was ≥ 30% 
< 40% the date was slipped by 4 years, and where the probability was ≥ 
20% < 30% it was slipped by 5 years.  Where the probability was < 20% it 
was slipped by 6 years. 
 
The modelling calculates the returns to all the projects using a variety of 
investment hurdles.  These include the discount rates identified in the 
Consultation document for the WACC.  Results are also shown in both real 
and MOD terms to highlight the effect of inflation.  The results are shown 
post-tax except where pre-tax is clearly stated. 
 
4. Results 
A. $50, 40 pence prices in real terms 
In Table 6 the numbers of fields which pass specified hurdles in real terms 
at the $50, 40 pence real price scenarios are shown.  In Table 7 the numbers 
which pass the same hurdles in MOD terms are shown. 
  
15 
 
Table 6 
Numbers of fields passing hurdles in real term @ $50, 40 pence prices 
  
10% 
RNPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
10% 
RNPV/I 
0.5 
Hurdle 
Real 
IRR 
10% 
Real 
IRR 
15% 
Real       
Pre-tax 
Cashflow 
Real 
Pre-
tax 
10% 
10% 
RNPV>£10m 
 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Probable 4 3 7 7 11 7 7 
Possible 3 2 7 3 11 7 6 
Technical 
Reserves 51 18 118 96 158 118 81 
New 
Exploration 45 22 78 75 90 78 77 
 
Table 7 
Numbers of fields passing hurdles in MOD terms @ $50, 40 pence prices 
 
10% 
NNPV/
I 0.3 
Hurdle 
10% 
NNPV/
I 0.5 
Hurdle 
Nomina
l IRR 
10% 
Nomina
l IRR 
15% 
Nominal 
Pre-tax 
Cashflo
w 
Nomina
l Pre-
tax 10% 
10% 
NNPV>£10
m 
 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Probable 6 4 7 7 11 7 7 
Possible 4 2 8 6 11 8 8 
Technical 
Reserves 55 27 134 100 162 133 105 
New 
Exploration 60 34 83 76 91 83 82 
 
The results indicate that the largest number of post-tax passes is with the 
IRR at10%.  There are 22 fields which pass this hurdle in MOD terms but 
fail in real terms.  Virtually all the fields which pass this hurdle pre-tax do 
continue to do so after tax. 
 
A striking feature is the much lower numbers of passes when NPV/I > 0.3 
is used as the hurdle compared to IRR@10%.  The number of passes falls 
from 118 to 51 in real terms, and from 134 to 55 in MOD terms.  This 
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generally reflets the relatively small materiality of returns in fields in the 
categories of technical reserves and new discoveries. 
 
When the hurdle is increased from IRR of 10% to IRR of 15% the numbers 
of passes in the categories of technical reserves and new discoveries fall by 
a significant but not dramatic number in both real and MOD terms.  At the 
hurdle of IRR at 15% the number of passes in the 2 categories of fields 
remains very much greater than the case with the hurdle at NPV/I > 0.3.  
This applies to both real and MOD conditions. 
 
When the hurdle is NPV/I > 0.5 the number of passes is dramatically less 
than when the pass is NPV/I > 0.3.  The great majority of the fields in the 
categories of technical reserves and new discoveries cannot approach this 
very demanding hurdle. 
 
In Table 8 the individual fields which fail the NPV/I hurdle in real terms 
but pass in MOD terms are listed.  There are 22 in total.  The timing of their 
development obviously varies over the period to 2050 and their 
development costs per boe in MOD terms are affected by the inflation. 
 
Table 8 
Fields which fail NPV/I > 0.3 hurdle in real terms but pass in MOD terms 
$50 
Nominal 
10% 
NNPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
Real Pre-
tax 
Cashflow 
Real 
Pre-tax 
10% 
10% 
RNPV> 
£10m 
K Pass + + Pass 
A Pass + + Pass 
B Pass + + Pass 
Field 7 Pass + + Pass 
Field 126 Pass + + Pass 
Field 178 Pass + + Pass 
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Field 194 Pass + + Pass 
Find 2 Pass + + Pass 
Find 11 Pass + + Pass 
Find 16 Pass + + Pass 
Find 35 Pass + + Pass 
Find 43 Pass + + Pass 
Find 53 Pass + + Pass 
Find 59 Pass + + Pass 
Find 69 Pass + + Pass 
Find 77 Pass + + Pass 
Find 78 Pass + + Pass 
Find 85 Pass + + Pass 
Find 88 Pass + + Pass 
Find 89 Pass + + Pass 
Find 94 Pass + + Pass 
Find 95 Pass + + Pass 
 
In Table 9 the fields which fail the NPV/I > 0.5 hurdle in real terms but 
pass in MOD terms are listed.  There are 25 in total (though not the same 
as those shown in Table 8). 
 
Table 9 
Fields which fail NPV/I > 0.5 hurdle in real terms but pass in MOD terms 
$50 
Nominal 
10% 
NNPV/I 
0.5 
Hurdle 
Real Pre-
tax 
Cashflow 
Real 
Pre-tax 
10% 
10% 
RNPV> 
£10m 
B2 Pass + + Pass 
Field 29 Pass + + Pass 
Field 34 Pass + + Pass 
Field 35 Pass + + Pass 
Field 150 Pass + + Pass 
Field 155 Pass + + Pass 
Field 163 Pass + + Pass 
Field 187 Pass + + Pass 
Field 209 Pass + + Pass 
Field 222 Pass + +  
Find 3 Pass + + Pass 
Find 12 Pass + + Pass 
Find 13 Pass + + Pass 
Find 14 Pass + + Pass 
Find 15 Pass + + Pass 
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Find 33 Pass + + Pass 
Find 38 Pass + + Pass 
Find 41 Pass + + Pass 
Find 44 Pass + + Pass 
Find 49 Pass + + Pass 
Find 81 Pass + + Pass 
Find 97 Pass + + Pass 
 
In Table 10 the fields which fail the hurdle IRR ≥ 10% in real terms but 
pass in MOD terms are shown.  Coincidentally there are 22 of them. 
 
Table 10 
Fields which fail IRR ≥ 10% hurdle in real terms but pass in MOD terms 
$50 
Nominal 
Nominal 
IRR 10% 
Real Pre-
tax 
Cashflow 
Real 
Pre-tax 
10% 
10% 
RNPV> 
£10m 
T Pass + -  
Field 3 Pass + -  
Field 45 Pass + -  
Field 114 Pass + -  
Field 142 Pass + -  
Field 148 Pass + -  
Field 164 Pass + -  
Field 167 Pass + -  
Field 192 Pass + -  
Field 200 Pass + -  
Field 207 Pass + -  
Field 210 Pass + -  
Field 212 Pass + -  
Field 219 Pass + -  
Field 225 Pass + -  
Field 233 Pass + -  
Field 239 Pass + -  
Find 21 Pass + -  
Find 24 Pass + -  
Find 31 Pass + -  
Find 70 Pass + -  
Find 74 Pass + -  
 
In Table 11 the fields which fail IRR ≥ 15% hurdle in real yterms but pass 
in MOD terms are shown. 
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Table 11 
Fields which fail IRR ≥ 15% hurdle in real terms but pass in MOD terms 
$50 
Nominal 
Nominal 
IRR 15% 
Real Pre-
tax 
Cashflow 
Real 
Pre-tax 
10% 
10% 
RNPV> 
£10m 
Nominal 
Devex/boe 
£ 
B Pass + + Pass 8.01 
C Pass + + Pass 10.53 
B3 Pass + +  10.55 
Field 17 Pass + + Pass 12.56 
Field 46 Pass + +  22.87 
Field 98 Pass + +  15.69 
Field 110 Pass + + Pass 23.09 
 
The fields passing and failing the hurdles at the discount rates in the 
Consultaion document are now discussed.  In Table 12 the numbers of 
fields which pass the hurdle NPV/I > 0.2 in MOD terms are shown at a 
wide range of discount rates below 10% in MOD terms.  In Table 13 the 
results with hurdle of NPV/I > 0.3 in MOD terms are shown.  It is seen that 
increasing the hurdle from NPV/I > 0.2 to NPV/I > 0.3 has a significantly 
adverse effect on the number of fields passing at all discount rates shown.  
A comparison with the results in Table 6 also indicates that, with the NPV/I 
≥ 0.3 hurdle, the numbers passing are noticeably less when the discount 
rate is 10%. 
 
The results in Table 13 show the number of fields passing the hurdle of 
NPV/I ≥ 0.3 at the same discount rates.  There is seen to be a significant 
reduction in the number in the category of technical reserves compared to 
the NPV/I ≥ 0.2 hurdle.  It should be recalled that these fields are relatively 
high cost.  There is not so big a difference in the numbers in the category 
of future discoveries.  A comparison with Table 7 indicates that the 
numbers passing are substantially less when the discount rate is 10%. 
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Table 12 
Numbers of fields passing hurdle of NPV/I > 0.2 in MOD terms at different discount rates 
$50 Nominal 
4.9% 
NPV/I 
0.2 
Hurdle 
5% 
NPV/I 
0.2 
Hurdle 
6.5% 
NPV/I 
0.2 
Hurdle 
6.9% 
NPV/I 
0.2 
Hurdle 
7.2% 
NPV/I 
0.2 
Hurdle 
8.3% 
NPV/I 
0.2 
Hurdle 
 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Probable 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Possible 7 7 7 7 7 6 
Technical 
Reserves 106 104 91 90 88 84 
New 
Exploration 77 77 77 77 76 75 
 
 
Table 13 
Numbers of fields passing hurdle of NPV/I > 0.3 in MOD terms at different discount rates 
$50 Nominal 
4.9% 
NPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
5% 
NPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
6.5% 
NPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
6.9% 
NPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
7.2% 
NPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
8.3% 
NPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Probable 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Possible 7 7 6 6 5 5 
Technical 
Reserves 79 79 72 68 67 64 
New 
Exploration 74 74 68 67 66 65 
 
The fields which fail the MOD NPV/I ≥ 0.3 hurdle at 10% discount rate 
but pass with NPV/I ≥ 0.2 and lower discount rates are listed in Table 14.  
At 4.9% discount rate 71 fields pass.  At the 8.3% discount rate 46 pass. 
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Table 14 
Fields which fail the MOD NPV at 10% MOD Devex > 0.3 hurdle  
but pass with a lower discount rate and a 0.2 hurdle 
$50  
4.9% 
NPV/I 
0.2 
Hurdle 
5% 
NPV/I 
0.2 
Hurdle 
6.5% 
NPV/I 
0.2 
Hurdle 
6.9% 
NPV/I 
0.2 
Hurdle 
7.2% 
NPV/I 
0.2 
Hurdle 
8.3% 
NPV/I 
0.2 
Hurdle 
T Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass  
C Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
G Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 4 Pass Pass     
Field 6 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 11 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 12 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass  
Field 17 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass  
Field 22 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 30 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 42 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 43 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 45 Pass Pass     
Field 47 Pass Pass     
Field 48 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass  
Field 51 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 55 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 63 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 74 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 76 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 85 Pass Pass     
Field 88 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 94 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 98 Pass Pass     
Field 101 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 102 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 104 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 106 Pass      
Field 107 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 110 Pass Pass     
Field 111 Pass Pass Pass    
Field 119 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 122 Pass Pass     
Field 124 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 125 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 135 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 136 Pass Pass Pass Pass   
Field 138 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 139 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
22 
 
Field 161 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 165 Pass Pass     
Field 171 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 174 Pass Pass     
Field 189 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 192 Pass      
Field 203 Pass Pass Pass Pass   
Field 205 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 207 Pass Pass     
Field 211 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass  
Field 219 Pass Pass     
Field 228 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 237 Pass Pass     
Field 243 Pass Pass     
Field 247 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 22 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 23 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 26 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 27 Pass Pass Pass Pass   
Find 28 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 34 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 36 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 42 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 45 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 54 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 57 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 65 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass  
Find 72 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 76 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 84 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 90 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 93 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
 
In Table 15 the fields which failed the MOD NPV/I ≥ 0.3 hurdle but pass 
at lower discount rates are listed.  At 4.9% discount rate 41 fields pass 
(compared to 71 when the hurdle was NPV/I ≥ 0.2).  At 8.3% discount rate 
15 pass (compared to 46 when the hurdle was NPV/I ≥ 0.3). 
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Table 15 
Fields which fail the MOD NPV at 10% MOD Devex > 0.3 hurdle  
but pass with a lower discount rate and a 0.3 hurdle 
$50  
4.9% 
NPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
5% 
NPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
6.5% 
NPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
6.9% 
NPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
7.2% 
NPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
8.3% 
NPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
T Pass Pass     
C Pass Pass Pass Pass   
G Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 6 Pass Pass Pass    
Field 11 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass  
Field 22 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass  
Field 30 Pass Pass     
Field 42 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 43 Pass Pass Pass    
Field 55 Pass Pass Pass    
Field 63 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 74 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 94 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 101 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 102 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 104 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass  
Field 107 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 119 Pass Pass     
Field 124 Pass Pass     
Field 125 Pass Pass     
Field 135 Pass Pass     
Field 139 Pass Pass     
Field 161 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 171 Pass Pass     
Field 189 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 205 Pass Pass Pass    
Field 247 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass  
Find 22 Pass Pass     
Find 23 Pass Pass     
Find 26 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 28 Pass Pass Pass Pass   
Find 34 Pass Pass     
Find 36 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 54 Pass Pass     
Find 57 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass  
Find 65 Pass Pass     
Find 72 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 76 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 84 Pass Pass     
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Find 90 Pass Pass Pass    
Find 93 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
 
 
B. $60, 50 pence Prices in Real Terms 
In Table 16 the number of fields passing various hurdles with real prices of 
$60 and 50 pence are shown.  A comparison with the comparative results 
for the same hurdle with the $50, 40 pence prices case reveals that there is 
a dramatic increase in the numbers passing all the hurdles shown.  With 
NPV/I ≥ 0.3 at 10% discount rate the number of passing fields in the 
category of technical reserves increases from 51 to 104.  The number of 
new discoveries passing increases from 45 to 93.  If IRR of 15% were the 
threshold the number of passes of fields in the category of technical 
reserves increases from 96 to 161.  The number of new discoveries passing 
increases from 75 to 109.  The results confirm the view that future activity 
in the UKCS is very sensitive to movements in oil prices between $50 and 
$60 when used for investment screening purposes.  At the real 
NPV/I@10% > 0.3 hurdle the cumulative production 2017-2050 is 3.8 bn 
boe.  At the real IRR > 10% hurdle total production is 7 bn boe, and at IRR 
> 15% hurdle it is 5.3 bn boe. 
 
Table 16 
Fields passing hurdles with prices of $60 and 50 pence in real terms 
 
10% 
RNPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
10% 
RNPV/I 
0.5 
Hurdle 
Real 
IRR 
10% 
Real 
IRR 
15% 
Real       
Pre-tax 
Cashflow 
Real 
Pre-
tax 
10% 
10% 
RNPV> 
£10m 
 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Probable 7 4 13 11 14 13 13 
Possible 7 5 12 10 13 12 11 
Technical 
Reserves 104 60 184 161 229 184 160 
New 
Exploration 93 69 115 109 117 115 114 
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In Table 17 the numbers passing the hurdles in MOD terms are shown. 
 
Table 17 
Fields passing hurdles in MOD terms with prices of $60 and 50 pence in real terms 
 
10% 
NNPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
10% 
NNPV/I 
0.5 
Hurdle 
Nominal 
IRR 10% 
Nominal 
IRR 15% 
Nominal 
Pre-tax 
Cashflow 
Nominal 
Pre-tax 
10% 
10% 
NNPV> 
£10m 
 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Probable 7 6 13 11 14 13 13 
Possible 9 6 13 11 11 13 11 
Technical 
Reserves 124 71 197 172 231 195 175 
New 
Exploration 98 78 115 112 117 115 115 
 
A comparison with the results in Table 7 again indicates that the numbers 
of future developments are much higher than those with the $50, 40 pence 
price.  With the NPV/I @ 10% ≥ 0.3 hurdle the number of passing fields in 
the technical reserves category increases from 55 to 124 while the number 
of passes from fields in the new discoveries category increases from 60 to 
98.  If IRR of 15% were the hurdle the number of passes of technical 
reserves fields increases from 100 to 172.  The number of passes in the new 
discoveries category increases from 76 to 112.  With the MOD 
NPV/I@10% > 0.3 hurdle cumulative production 2017-2050 is 4.9 bn boe.  
With MOD IRR > 10% it is 7.5 bn boe, and with MOD IRR > 15% it is 6.1 
bn boe. 
 
A list of the fields which pass the NPV/I @ 10% ≥ 0.3 hurdle in MOD 
terms but fail in real terms is shown in Table 18.  There are 27 such fields. 
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Table 18 
Fields which fail NPV/I @ 10% ≥ 0.3 hurdle in real terms but pass in MOD terms 
$60  
10% 
NNPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
Real Pre-
tax 
Cashflow 
Real 
Pre-tax 
10% 
10% 
RNPV> 
£10m 
G Pass + +  
T Pass + + Pass 
Field 3 Pass + + Pass 
Field 46 Pass + +  
Field 97 Pass + + Pass 
Field 115 Pass + + Pass 
Field 129 Pass + + Pass 
Field 133 Pass + + Pass 
Field 142 Pass + + Pass 
Field 167 Pass + + Pass 
Field 174 Pass + + Pass 
Field 186 Pass + + Pass 
Field 203 Pass + + Pass 
Field 205 Pass + + Pass 
Field 207 Pass + + Pass 
Field 210 Pass + + Pass 
Field 212 Pass + + Pass 
Field 217 Pass + + Pass 
Field 218 Pass + + Pass 
Field 219 Pass + + Pass 
Field 237 Pass + + Pass 
Field 243 Pass + + Pass 
Find 21 Pass + + Pass 
Find 24 Pass + + Pass 
Find 31 Pass + + Pass 
Find 39 Pass + + Pass 
Find 70 Pass + + Pass 
 
In Table 19 the fields are shown which fail the very demanding hurdle of 
NPV/I @ 10% ≥ 0.5 but pass in MOD terms.  There are 23 in total.  All but 
one have a positive real NPV@10%.   
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Table 19 
Fields which fail NPV/I ≥ 0.5 hurdle in real terms but pass in MOD terms 
$60  
10% 
NNPV/I 
0.5 
Hurdle 
Real Pre-
tax 
Cashflow 
Real 
Pre-tax 
10% 
10% 
RNPV> 
£10m 
A Pass + + Pass 
K Pass + + Pass 
C Pass + + Pass 
Field 11 Pass + + Pass 
Field 22 Pass + + Pass 
Field 30 Pass + + Pass 
Field 55 Pass + -  
Field 63 Pass + + Pass 
Field 74 Pass + + Pass 
Field 94 Pass + + Pass 
Field 102 Pass + + Pass 
Field 135 Pass + + Pass 
Field 161 Pass + + Pass 
Field 189 Pass + + Pass 
Find 36 Pass + + Pass 
Find 69 Pass + + Pass 
Find 72 Pass + + Pass 
Find 76 Pass + + Pass 
Find 85 Pass + + Pass 
Find 89 Pass + + Pass 
Find 93 Pass + + Pass 
Find 98 Pass + + Pass 
Find 102 Pass + + Pass 
 
In Table 20 the fields which fail the hurdle of IRR > 10% in real terms but 
pass in MOD terms are shown.  There are 14 of them. 
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Table 20 
Fields which fail IRR ≥ 10% hurdle in real terms but pass in MOD terms 
$60  
Nominal 
IRR 10% 
Real Pre-
tax 
Cashflow 
Real 
Pre-tax 
10% 
10% 
RNPV> 
£10m 
R Pass + - Pass 
Field 20 Pass + -  
Field 31 Pass + -  
Field 41 Pass + -  
Field 49 Pass + -  
Field 56 Pass + -  
Field 57 Pass + -  
Field 89 Pass + -  
Field 90 Pass + -  
Field 132 Pass + -  
Field 144 Pass + -  
Field 177 Pass + -  
Field 236 Pass + -  
Field 241 Pass + -  
 
In Table 21 the fields which fail the hurdle of IRR > 15% in real terms but 
pass in MOD terms are listed. 
 
Table 21 
Fields which fail IRR ≥ 15% hurdle in real terms but pass in MOD terms 
$60  
Nominal 
IRR 15% 
Real Pre-
tax 
Cashflow 
Real 
Pre-tax 
10% 
10% 
RNPV> 
£10m 
G Pass + +  
Field 18 Pass + + Pass 
Field 45 Pass + + Pass 
Field 118 Pass + + Pass 
Field 131 Pass + + Pass 
Field 172 Pass + +  
Field 190 Pass + +  
Field 213 Pass + + Pass 
Field 214 Pass + + Pass 
Field 220 Pass + + Pass 
Field 242 Pass + + Pass 
Field 248 Pass + +  
Find 68 Pass + + Pass 
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Find 108 Pass + + Pass 
Find 111 Pass + + Pass 
 
Table 22 
Fields which pass hurdle of NPV/I ≥ 0.2 in MOD terms at different discount rates 
$60  
4.9% 
NPV/I 
0.2 
Hurdle 
5% 
NPV/I 
0.2 
Hurdle 
6.5% 
NPV/I 
0.2 
Hurdle 
6.9% 
NPV/I 
0.2 
Hurdle 
7.2% 
NPV/I 
0.2 
Hurdle 
8.3% 
NPV/I 
0.2 
Hurdle 
 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Probable 12 12 12 12 11 11 
Possible 12 12 11 11 11 11 
Technical 
Reserves 175 175 164 162 161 157 
New 
Exploration 115 115 112 112 112 111 
 
In Table 22 the numbers of fields which pass the hurdle of NPV/I ≥ 0.2 in 
MOD terms are shown with the $60, 50 pence price scenario.  A 
comparison with the corresponding results at the $50, 40 pence scenario 
reveals the much larger numbers with the higher price.  At the 5% discount 
rate there are 314 passes at the higher price compared to 194 at the lower 
one.  At the 8.3% discount rate there are 290 passes at the higher price 
compared to 171 at the lower price.  At the $60 price with 5% discount rate 
cumulative production to 2050 is 6.3 bn boe. 
 
Table 23 
Fields which pass hurdle of NPV/I ≥ 0.3 in MOD terms at different discount rates 
$60  
4.9% 
NPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
5% 
NPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
6.5% 
NPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
6.9% 
NPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
7.2% 
NPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
8.3% 
NPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Probable 10 10 9 9 9 10 
Possible 11 11 11 11 11 10 
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Technical 
Reserves 155 155 149 146 144 140 
New 
Exploration 108 108 106 105 104 101 
 
In Table 23 the numbers of passes at the hurdle NPV/I ≥ 0.3 in MOD terms 
are shown at different discount rates.  Again the numbers are much higher 
compared to the lower price.  Thus at 5% discount rate there are 284 passes 
at the higher price compared to 166 at the lower price.  At 8.3% discount 
rate there are 261 passes compared to 140 at the lower price.  At the 5% 
discount rate with the $60 price cumulative production to 2050 from the 
fields is 6.5 bn boe.  At the 8.3% discount rate it is 5.7 bn boe. 
 
Table 24 
Fields which fail the NPV/I@10% ≥ 0.2 in MOD terms but pass at lower discount rates 
$60  
4.9% 
NPV/I 
0.2 
Hurdle 
5% 
NPV/I 
0.2 
Hurdle 
6.5% 
NPV/I 
0.2 
Hurdle 
6.9% 
NPV/I 
0.2 
Hurdle 
7.2% 
NPV/I 
0.2 
Hurdle 
8.3% 
NPV/I 
0.2 
Hurdle 
C3 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
C4 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
J2 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass  
L Pass Pass Pass Pass   
P Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
R2 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
A2 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
C5 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
R Pass Pass     
Field 5 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 9 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 18 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass  
Field 25 Pass Pass     
Field 28 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 32 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 36 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 38 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 45 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 49 Pass Pass     
Field 59 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
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Field 64 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 66 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass  
Field 67 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass  
Field 91 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 114 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 118 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass  
Field 120 Pass Pass     
Field 123 Pass Pass     
Field 130 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 131 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 141 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 148 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 149 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 152 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 158 Pass Pass     
Field 160 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 164 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 173 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 176 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 179 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 181 Pass Pass     
Field 182 Pass Pass     
Field 188 Pass Pass Pass    
Field 190 Pass Pass     
Field 192 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 193 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 200 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 213 Pass Pass Pass Pass   
Field 214 Pass Pass     
Field 215 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 220 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 223 Pass Pass     
Field 224 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 225 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 226 Pass Pass     
Field 230 Pass Pass Pass    
Field 233 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 238 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 239 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 242 Pass Pass     
Find 20 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 37 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 40 Pass Pass     
Find 55 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 60 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 61 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 64 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
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Find 68 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 71 Pass Pass     
Find 74 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 79 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 96 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 103 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 108 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 110 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 111 Pass Pass     
 
In Table 24 the fields which fail the NPV/I@10% ≥ 0.2 hurdle but pass at 
lower discount rates are shown.  There are 76 in total.  All of them pass at 
the 5% discount rate and the great majority at 7.2% and 8.3% rates.  With 
the $60 price at 5% discount rate total production to 2050 from the passing 
fields is 7.6 bn boe.  At the 7.2% discount rate it is 6.6 bn boe, and at 8.3% 
discount rate 6.3 bn boe. 
 
Table 25 
Fields which fail the MOD NPV@10% / MOD Devex > 0.3 hurdle 
but pass with a lower discount rate and 0.3 hurdle 
$60  
4.9% 
NPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
5% 
NPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
6.5% 
NPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
6.9% 
NPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
7.2% 
NPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
8.3% 
NPV/I 
0.3 
Hurdle 
C3 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
J2 Pass Pass     
P Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
R2 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
A2 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass  
C5 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 5 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass  
Field 9 Pass Pass Pass    
Field 28 Pass Pass     
Field 36 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 38 Pass Pass     
Field 45 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 59 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass  
Field 64 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 91 Pass Pass     
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Field 114 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 130 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass  
Field 131 Pass Pass Pass Pass   
Field 141 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 148 Pass Pass     
Field 149 Pass Pass     
Field 152 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 160 Pass Pass Pass Pass   
Field 164 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 173 Pass Pass     
Field 176 Pass Pass Pass    
Field 179 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 192 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 193 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass  
Field 200 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 215 Pass Pass     
Field 220 Pass Pass     
Field 224 Pass Pass Pass    
Field 225 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass  
Field 233 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 238 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Field 239 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 20 Pass Pass     
Find 55 Pass Pass Pass    
Find 60 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 61 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass  
Find 64 Pass Pass     
Find 68 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass  
Find 74 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
Find 103 Pass Pass Pass Pass   
Find 108 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass  
Find 110 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass 
 
In Table 25 the fields which fail the NPV/I@10% ≥ 0.3 hurdle in MOD 
terms but pass at lower discount rates are listed.  There are 47 in total.  All 
pass at the 5% discount rate but at the 8.3% rate only 20 pass. 
 
In Table 26 the cumulative production in the period 2017-2050 from the 
fields passing the various hurdles are shown. 
 
  
34 
 
Table 26 
Production from 2017 to 2050 from new fields passing hurdles with $60, 50 pence prices 
 
 
 
  
10% RNPV/I 
0.3 Hurdle 
Real IRR 
10% 
Real IRR 
15% 
10% NNPV/I 
0.3 Hurdle 
Nominal 
IRR 10% 
Nominal IRR 
15% 
MMboe 3823.4 6989.9 5301.6 4860.9 7503.6 6089.3 
 
5% NPV/I 0.2 
Hurdle 
7.2% NPV/I 
0.2 Hurdle 
8.3% NPV/I 
0.2 Hurdle 
5% NPV/I 
0.3 Hurdle 
7.2% NPV/I 0.3 
Hurdle 
8.3% NPV/I 
0.3 Hurdle 
MMboe 7644.6 6576.1 6346.8 6461.0 5774.0 5669.4 
 
The differences in the recovery of petroleum over the period to 2050 in 
relation to the hurdle rates employed are very noticeable.  To the extent 
that the relatively low rates noted in the Consultation document reflect 
in part the current low borrowing costs they may not be appropriate for 
investments taking place over the long period to 2050 because the 
current low interest rates are unlikely to remain over the next 30 years.  
Inflation rates are also unlikely to remain at 2% for the next 30 years.  
Higher inflation rates increase the difference between returns in MOD 
terms and real terms.  Investors should be primarily interested in returns 
in real terms. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions  
Hurdle rates employed to make investment decisions are likely to depend on 
several factors.  These certainly include the WACC of the investor as emphasised 
in the Consultation document, but in the context of current conditions in the 
UKCS there are other releveant considerations.  A feature of the operating 
environment is the prevalence of many small undeveloped discoveries.  These 
can generate only modest NPVs even with a very low WACC being used as the 
discount rate.  In an environment of capital rationing a project with a very modest 
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(but positive) materiality may not be acceptable even though the IRR is well 
above the WACC.  The size of the expected NPV is more important.  Reflecting 
the presence of capital rationing a discount rate higher than the WACC may be 
employed to calculate the NPV.  Thus a rate of 10% in post-tax terms is very 
commonly employed in the industry, sometimes in real and sometimes in MOD 
terms.   
 
The indicative range of WACC in the Consultation document to a substantial 
extent reflects current very low costs of debt which may not prevail over the long 
term.  The finding that the WACC for large, vertically integrated companies is 
generally lower than for smaller, non-integrated companies is in accordance with 
first principles reflecting the risk-reducing advantages of large, diversified 
portfolios of projects.  But these larger companies still operate in a capital-
constrained environment in the UKCS, as they have to compare multiple 
opportunities around the world, and the UKCS has to compete for investment 
funds.  Capital rationing can be reflected by employing the NPV/I ratio as a 
screening and ranking device.  It directly measures the productivity of the capital 
employed.  It is widely employed in the industry.  The Consultation document 
refers to minimum acceptable ratios of 0.2 or 0.3 with the NPV on a post-tax 
basis.  These ratios are consistent with practive believed to be common in the 
industry. 
 
The modelling undertaken in this study highlights the numbers of new field 
developments in different categories which pass or fail the various investment 
hurdles discussed above under (real) price scenarios of (1) $50, 40 pence and (2) 
$60, 50 pence over the period to 2050.  It was found that there was a large increase 
in the number of passes at the $60, 50 pence price case compared to the $50, 40 
pence one under all the investment hurdles examined.  It was found that the 
number of passes with hurdles of (real) IRR > 10% and IRR > 15% greatly 
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exceeded the number using NPV/I@10% > 0.3 as the hurdle.  The modest 
materiality of many of the fields was a key factor.  There was also found to be a 
worthwhile increase in the number of developments when the threshold returns 
used a discount rate of 10% in MOD terms compared to 10% in real terms. 
 
When lower discount rates such as are employed in the Consultation document 
were employed it was found that the numbers of passes increased significantly 
with all the hurdles examined, compared to the case with 10% discount rate.  This 
applied to both oil/gas price scenarios. 
 
The consequences of employing the different hurdles for production from new 
fields in the period to 2050 were then examined under the $60, 50 pence price 
case.  The variations were found to be striking.  Thus with the hurdle of real 
NPV/I@10% > 0.3 cumulative production from new fields to 2050 is 3.8 bn boe 
while with real IRR of 10% it is nearly 7 bn boe.  At IRR of 15% it is 5.3 bn boe.  
If the hurdle were MOD or nominal NPV/I@10% > 0.3 the cumulative 
production from new fields to 2050 becomes 4.9 bn boe.  With MOD or nominal 
NPV/I@8.3% > 0.3 hurdle the cumulative production is 5.7 bn boe.  With MOD 
or nominal NPV/I@8.3% > 0.2 hurdle the cumulative production becomes 6.35 
bn boe.  These results clearly highlight the importance of the different hurdles 
and discount rates in considering the future economic recovery from the UKCS.  
Empirical and reliable knowledge of these is thus clearly important.  This also 
applies to investors in infrastructure transportation.  There now are such 
independent investors but it is not clear how their discount rates are best 
measured.  Infrastructure investment in the UKCS is likely to have more risks 
than in onshore transmission of electricity and gas.  For example, the volume risk 
is likely to be greater. 
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In sum the measurement of satisfactory expected returns on investment in the 
UKCS should incorporate key characteristics of the sector which include modest 
materiality of many of the project and capital rationing.  Further thought could 
also be given to the position of stand-alone exploration investors. 
